In case you didn't see it, I mentinoed in a comment to someone else that David Albert's book was the first book I ever read on quantum mechanics, and reading it in high school helped a lot when I got to college. I sometimes wonder if some of it would sound overly simplistic now if I went back, but I definitely have fond memories of it.
Regarding Finkelstein, yes--obviously there's a lot more to his view of quantum mechanics, but at least within the context of the interpretation of quantum mechanics, I think he fits in the antirealist camp.
There are of course, so many definitions of realism that you could find any number of them that either apply or don't apply to his theory. But one of the mantras I remember him repeating the most is "there are no such thing as objects" and "there are no such thing as states". Granted, he believed in some kind of replacement for objects/states, namely actions or processes. So maybe you could call him a realist about processes? And maybe you know more about process metaphysics or how that is supposed to work, but I don't know anything other than the few things he told us while I was taking his class and what I read in his book.
At any rate, I think when you're trying to categorize various interpretations of quantum mechanics, the antirealist/realist designation I think is usually based on whether you're a realist about either particles or the wavefunction. Or more generally, whether you believe that there is some state that you're measuring, or if it's just all measurements and outcomes,with no "state of the world" being measured. I think Finkelstein would wholeheartedly side with the antirealists on any of these phrasings.
I'd be curious to hear your reasoning though if you think he's not an antirealist.
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timeasmymeasure
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Date: 2011-03-22 07:08 am (UTC)Regarding Finkelstein, yes--obviously there's a lot more to his view of quantum mechanics, but at least within the context of the interpretation of quantum mechanics, I think he fits in the antirealist camp.
There are of course, so many definitions of realism that you could find any number of them that either apply or don't apply to his theory. But one of the mantras I remember him repeating the most is "there are no such thing as objects" and "there are no such thing as states". Granted, he believed in some kind of replacement for objects/states, namely actions or processes. So maybe you could call him a realist about processes? And maybe you know more about process metaphysics or how that is supposed to work, but I don't know anything other than the few things he told us while I was taking his class and what I read in his book.
At any rate, I think when you're trying to categorize various interpretations of quantum mechanics, the antirealist/realist designation I think is usually based on whether you're a realist about either particles or the wavefunction. Or more generally, whether you believe that there is some state that you're measuring, or if it's just all measurements and outcomes,with no "state of the world" being measured. I think Finkelstein would wholeheartedly side with the antirealists on any of these phrasings.
I'd be curious to hear your reasoning though if you think he's not an antirealist.