I think the way this sort of thing would have to work is to think about the more general types of actions that these fall under. It is essential for lying to work that most other speakers are telling the truth, or at least for the audience to have the reasonable belief that this is true.
I must not be seeing what you're getting at here. Are you trying to argue that right and wrong come from whether someone is behaving the way everyone else is (like, if everyone else is telling the truth and you're not you must be the wrong one)?
I feel like I know you well enough that you must not be saying that, however I can't seem to think of what else you might be saying here. The abuse case, and responding to the Nazi objection about lying, would depend on some sort of analysis of the general notion of what it is to be a rational agent, and I don't really see how it's going to work yet.
I don't think there is anything moral built in to our notions of "rational agents". Being rational will make you better at being able to achieve your goals, and it can also help you figure out what subgoals need to be achieved in order to attain a more longterm or general goal. But it doesn't help you pick fundamental values. A rational egoist is going to make very different moral choices than a rational altruist or communitarian, for instance.
While I enjoy discussing this with you, I'm wondering if you could recommend any books on this. Ideally, what I'd want is some kind of brief but non-superficial book that lays out the case for objective moral truth. I'd love to believe there's a way to make that work, but I just don't see any way it *could* work.
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timeasmymeasure
Re: the is-ought gap
Date: 2010-10-26 06:51 pm (UTC)I think the way this sort of thing would have to work is to think about the more general types of actions that these fall under. It is essential for lying to work that most other speakers are telling the truth, or at least for the audience to have the reasonable belief that this is true.
I must not be seeing what you're getting at here. Are you trying to argue that right and wrong come from whether someone is behaving the way everyone else is (like, if everyone else is telling the truth and you're not you must be the wrong one)?
I feel like I know you well enough that you must not be saying that, however I can't seem to think of what else you might be saying here.
The abuse case, and responding to the Nazi objection about lying, would depend on some sort of analysis of the general notion of what it is to be a rational agent, and I don't really see how it's going to work yet.
I don't think there is anything moral built in to our notions of "rational agents". Being rational will make you better at being able to achieve your goals, and it can also help you figure out what subgoals need to be achieved in order to attain a more longterm or general goal. But it doesn't help you pick fundamental values. A rational egoist is going to make very different moral choices than a rational altruist or communitarian, for instance.
While I enjoy discussing this with you, I'm wondering if you could recommend any books on this. Ideally, what I'd want is some kind of brief but non-superficial book that lays out the case for objective moral truth. I'd love to believe there's a way to make that work, but I just don't see any way it *could* work.