Ok, that sounds reasonable (about being "close enough" to count as belief while allowing for some variation). A good knife is something that cuts smoothly and easily, though many things that don't cut smoothly and easily will count as knives to some extent because they manage to cut in some way. Similarly, a good chair will support someone sitting on it very well and comfortably, while many things will count as chairs in virtue of doing it not so well.
Making analogies to good knives and good chairs initially sounds like a great starting point for some kind of objective values. But I see a lot of problems with that. I think these examples appear to work well because there is a particular function or purpose that is built into the intension of concepts like "chair" or "knife". It's not much of a simplification to say that a knife is defined as something which is intended to be used for cutting, and that a chair is defined as something which is intended to be sat in. There are a lot of different arrangements of molecules that could satisfy those requirements, making them a better or worse chair or knife. But all of this is because you have a specific purpose in mind. I think it's only ever possible to say that something is "good" if you can answer the question "good for what?" The same object might be good for sitting in but bad for cutting, or good or bad for any number of other purposes. But what is the purpose of an object? Whatever a particular sentient being, or some social group, or some society wants it to be. Whatever satisfies their needs, desires, goals, etc. So it seems that there is just as much relativism and subjectivity that creeps in as with any kind of statement about good or bad.
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timeasmymeasure
Re: the is-ought gap
Date: 2010-10-15 04:32 pm (UTC)A good knife is something that cuts smoothly and easily, though many things that don't cut smoothly and easily will count as knives to some extent because they manage to cut in some way. Similarly, a good chair will support someone sitting on it very well and comfortably, while many things will count as chairs in virtue of doing it not so well.
Making analogies to good knives and good chairs initially sounds like a great starting point for some kind of objective values. But I see a lot of problems with that. I think these examples appear to work well because there is a particular function or purpose that is built into the intension of concepts like "chair" or "knife". It's not much of a simplification to say that a knife is defined as something which is intended to be used for cutting, and that a chair is defined as something which is intended to be sat in. There are a lot of different arrangements of molecules that could satisfy those requirements, making them a better or worse chair or knife. But all of this is because you have a specific purpose in mind. I think it's only ever possible to say that something is "good" if you can answer the question "good for what?" The same object might be good for sitting in but bad for cutting, or good or bad for any number of other purposes. But what is the purpose of an object? Whatever a particular sentient being, or some social group, or some society wants it to be. Whatever satisfies their needs, desires, goals, etc. So it seems that there is just as much relativism and subjectivity that creeps in as with any kind of statement about good or bad.